

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

AECE-00 DRC-01 EB-11 ACDE-00 /163 W

----- 011925

P R 041239Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 254

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENN 0136

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ALLIED PRESENTATION

FOR 4 JULY PLENARY

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. AT THE JULY 4 PLENARY MEETING  
OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, STATEMENTS WERE DELIVERED  
BY THE BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSEN) AND THE BULGARIAN  
REP (DICHEV). TEXT OF THE BULGARIAN STATEMENT IS  
BEING TRANSMITTED BY SEPTEL. ENGLISH LANGUAGE  
TEXT OF THE BELGIAN STATEMENT, AS APPROVED BY THE  
AHG JULY 3, READS AS FOLLOWS: END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

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2. MR. CHARIMAN, WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENTS DURING THIS

SESSION HAVE CONCENTRATED ON ISSUES RELATED TO PHASING AND REDUCTIONS.

3. ON JUNE 20, MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE REVIEWED THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS. HE RESTATED OUR FIRM VIEW THAT REDUCTIONS MUST BE BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME, AND THAT A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT MUST REPRESENT SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS THIS OBJECTIVE. HE ALSO EXPLAINED WHY A PHASED APPROACH IS THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY TO REDUCE THE FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND WHY REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD BE MADE BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION ONLY.

4. WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE QUESTION OF WHICH COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES FIRST IN ORDER TO FIND WAYS OF REACHING A FIRST TENTATIVE UNDERSTANDING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. TODAY, HOWEVER, I WISH TO REVIEW SOME OTHER FEATURES OF THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS WHICH THE WEST PRESENTED LAST NOVEMBER 22.

5. ONE ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THE WESTERN APPROACH, ON WHICH, IN FACT, THERE APPEARS TO BE A GENERAL CONSENSUS, IS THAT ANY AGREEMENT EMERGING FROM OUR NEGOTIATIONS MUST SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS. IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO OUR OBJECTIVES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IF REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE RESULTED IN INCREASED RISKS OF CONFRONTATION IN OTHER AREAS OF EUROPE. THAT IS WHY THE WEST HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES.

6. I HAVE JUST MENTIONED CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO RECALL THAT THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES STILL REMAINS TO BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED.

7. MR. CHAIRMAN, AS THE AGREED TITLE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS STATES, THE NEGOTIATION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES IS PART OF OUR TASK HERE.

8. IN HIS PRESENTATION ON JUNE 20, THE CANADIAN REPRE-

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SENTATIVE POINTED OUT THAT A PROGRAM OF REDUCTIONS AIMED AT AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME IS ESSENTIAL IF THE PARTICIPANTS ARE TO ACHIEVE THEIR AGREED GOALS OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. TO REACH THESE GOALS, IN PARTICULAR THAT OF ENHANCING STABILITY, IT WILL BE EQUALLY NECESSARY TO WORK OUT APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

9. MOREOVER, ASSOCIATED MEASURES WILL BE NECESSARY TO

RESOLVE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH WILL RESULT FROM REDUCTIONS. REDUCTIONS TAKEN IN ISOLATION FROM ASSOCIATED MEASURES WOULD NOT REDUCE EXISTING POSSIBILITIES FOR MISUNDERSTANDINGS, SUSPICIONS AND POLITICAL FRICTION, AND WOULD EVEN CREATE NEW ONES. A REDUCTION SCHEME WHICH OMITTED ASSOCIATED MEASURES COULD NOT BE VIABLE OR CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. ONLY WHEN ASSOCIATED MEASURES HAVE BEEN AGREED WILL ALL PARTIES HAVE POSITIVE ASSURANCE THAT THE PURPOSE OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS IS, IN FACT, BEING SERVED IN BOTH LETTER AND SPIRIT.

10. IT WAS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT MY COLLEAGUES AND I SUGGESTED SOME ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN A SERIES OF PLENARY STATEMENTS IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH OF THIS YEAR, WHILE STATING THAT ADDITIONAL ONES MAY BE NECESSARY. MY COLLEAGUES AND I REMAIN READY TO DISCUSS THESE PROPOSALS. IN VIEW OF THEIR IMPORTANCE, I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THEM TODAY.

11. THERE OUGHT TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE NECESSITY OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION AS ONE TYPE OF ASSOCIATE MEASURE. THE REQUIREMENT FOR VERIFICATION DOES NOT ARISE OUT OF AN EXPECTATION THAT WITHOUT VERIFICATION AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE VIOLATED. GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS WHICH THEY DO NOT INTEND TO HONOR. HOWEVER, IN MATTERS VITAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY, A GOVERNMENT WHICH DID NOT ENSURE THAT AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO WERE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED WOULD BE FAILING IN ITS DUTY. THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION ARISES FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE. EACH PARTY MUST HAVE POSITIVE CONFIRMATION THAT AGREEMENTS REACHED ARE BEING RESPECTED BY ALL OTHER PARTIES, AND IT MUST ALSO HAVE ASSURANCE THAT, IN THE EVENT OF ANY BREACH OF AGREEMENT, IT WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES

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PROMPTLY. THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY MAKES IT THEREFORE NECESSARY TO DEVISE VERIFICATION MEASURES, THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF WHICH SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED.

12. IN HIS STATEMENT OF MARCH 14, THE LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE SET OUT THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. THIS POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0136

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

13. IN THIS STATEMENT, MY LUXEMBOURG COLLEAGUE EXPLAINED THE WESTERN PROPOSAL THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD AGREE NOT TO INTERFERE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. HE ALSO EXPLAINED WHY WE PROPOSE THAT MEASURES PROVIDING FOR NEGOTIATED INSPECTION BY OBSERVERS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

14. THE LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE STRESSED ON THE SAME OCCASION THE NEED FOR PROVISIONS TO ENSURE THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED. THIS FURTHER TYPE OF ASSOCIATED MEASURE REMAINS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT.

15. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE ALSO PROPOSED STABILIZING MEASURES TO ACCOMPANY AGREED REDUCTIONS. MY  
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COLLEAGUES AND I ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT MEASURES INTENDED

TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCE STABILITY BY REDUCING THE FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS, FOR EXAMPLE THOSE ARISING FROM AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES, SHOULD COMPLEMENT REDUCTIONS. STABILIZING MEASURES WOULD BE A NECESSARY AND SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO POST-REDUCTION STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

16. IN HIS STATEMENT OF MARCH 28, THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE DESCRIBED FOUR SPECIFIC STABILIZING MEASURES FOR PHASE I WHICH WOLD, IN COMBINATION, MATERIALLY ASSIST IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR AGREED OBJECTIVE. IN THE FIRST PLACE, PHASE I REDUCTIONS WILL OBVIOUSLY IMPLY LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. BUT SUCH LIMITATIONS WILL NECESSARILY REQUIRE CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS. THE LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE NORMALLY FLUCTUATE FOR SUCH REASONS AS EXERCISES, REPLACEMENTS AND ROTATIONS. AS AN EXAMPLE, FLUCTUATIONS IN SOVIET FORCE LEVELS ARE QUITE SUBSTANTIAL, Owing TO THE REPLACEMENT PRACTICES OF SOVIET FORCES. AN AGREEMENT WHICH RIGIDLY PREVENTED THESE ROUTINE FLUCTUATIONS WOULD IMPEDE THE NORMAL TRAINING AND REPLACEMENT OF THE FORCES REMAINING.

17. PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE TO ALLOW FOR SUCH FLUCTUATIONS ON BOTH SIDES. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF BOTH SIDES, SUCH FLUCTUATIONS IN POST-REDUCTION LEVELS SHOULD BE LIMITED IN MAGNITUDE. MOREOVER, EVEN IF LIMITED IN MAGNITUDE, ANY MOVEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF US OR SOVIET TROOPS INTO THE REDUCTION AREA AFTER REDUCTIONS COULD BE MISINTERPRETED AND BECOME A MAJOR SOURCE OF INSTABILITY UNLESS THE OTHER SIDE HAS ADEQUATE NOTICE THAT THEY ARE ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE. IT WILL THEREFORE BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH MOVEMENTS IN ADVANCE.

18. BECAUSE THE US AND USSR WILL HAVE LIMITED THEIR FREEDOM TO INTRODUCE MORE GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, BOTH THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR REMAINING FORCES AND THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES WILL BECOME MORE IMPORTANT. MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE THEREFORE PROPOSED STABILIZING MEASURES WITH REGARD TO MAJOR EXERCISES BY THE US AND SOVIET

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GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SUCH EXERCISES WOULD, AS IN THE CASE OF FORCE MOVEMENTS INTO THE AREA, HELP TO AVOID MISINTERPRETATIONS AND CONSEQUENT TENSION. LIMITS ON THE SIZE, NUMBER AND DURATION OF THESE EXERCISES ARE NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF AMBIGUITY AND THEREBY ENHANCE THE CONFIDENCE OF ALL PARTIES THAT THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE REDUCTION PROVISIONS WERE BEING RESPECTED. HOWEVER, THESE LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE AN ADEQUATE

LEVEL OF MILITARY TRAINING. FOR THE SAME REASONS, WE HAVE PROPOSED THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES; THIS WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CONFIDENCE.

19. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE STABILIZING MEASURES WOULD HELP TO ASSURE THAT MAJOR MOVEMENTS AND EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, ESSENTIAL AS THEY ARE TO NORMAL MILITARY PRACTICE, ARE NOT MISINTERPRETED OR WRONGLY PERCEIVED AS THREATENING TO THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY. MY COLLEAGUES AND I THEREFORE BELIEVE THESE PROPOSALS WOULD MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

20. IT IS EVIDENT THAT ALL THE ISSUES I HAVE DISCUSSED TODAY ARE INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS. THAT IS WHY ASSOCIATED MEASURES ARE IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. THEY SHOULD, FOR PRACTICAL REASONS, FOR REASONS OF SECURITY AND FOR REASONS OF CONFIDENCE, SUPPLEMENT ANY REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT REACHED HERE. TAKEN TOGETHER, FORCE REDUCTIONS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES WOULD MAXIMIZE OUR JOINT ABILITY TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

21. MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HOPE THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WILL BEAR IN MIND THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE INCLUSION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT. MY COLLEAGUES AND I WISH TO POINT OUT THAT, IF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS SEEK A TIMELY AGREEMENT, AS WE DO, IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO HEAR THEIR VIEWS ON THIS IMPORTANT PART OF THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT.RESOR

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptoning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** GROUND FORCES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS, SUMMIT MEETINGS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 04 JUL 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974MBFRV00136  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740178-0893  
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**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <09 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ALLIED PRESENTATION FOR 4 JULY PLENARY  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005